Chapter Three - September 8, 1943, and Its Consequences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 September 2009
Summary
September 8 and the King's Flight
Protagonists' accounts September 8, 1943, are even more contradictory than those concerning other events of the period. It becomes impossible to clarify the individual responsibilities for “the full folly of the Italian Government and Supreme Command.” The irrational behavior of Admiral Raffaele de Courten, chief of staff of the Italian Royal Navy, between the signing of the armistice on September 3 and its proclamation on September 8 is one of many elements that is difficult to explain. The roles played by various other actors in this drama and their relations with one another remain unclear. Obviously, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of government, kept the king informed, but the other military leaders also knew more than they admitted. After the fact, almost everyone claimed to have been kept ignorant of the negotiations, as if they had all been afflicted by amnesia. General Antonio Sorice, the war minister, even stated that he was told of the armistice only on September 8. Sorice was lying, because he had at least participated in the meeting with Badoglio on September 3, mentioned earlier. Ambrosio himself claimed that he had informed Sorice of the signing of the armistice in early September and had told de Courten and Sandalli of the negotiations as early as the end of August. On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that Ambrosio, who, as chief of the General Staff, saw the three armed services chiefs “nearly every afternoon,” did not keep them informed of what was happening.
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- A Nation CollapsesThe Italian Surrender of September 1943, pp. 91 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000