Contrivance, if eftablifhed, appears to me to prove every thing which we wifh to prove. Amongft other things it proves the perfonality of the Deity, as diftinguifhed from what is fometimes called nature, fometimes called a principle: which terms, in the mouths of thofe who ufe them philofophically, feem to be intended, to admit and to exprefs an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a perfonal agent. Now that which can contrive, which can defign, muft be a perfon. Thefe capacities conftitute perfonality, for they imply confcioufnefs and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpofe; as well as the power of providing means, and of directing them to their end. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the exiftence of a mind: and in whatever a mind refides is a perfon. The feat of intellect is a perfon. We have no authority to limit the properties of mind to any particular corporeal form, or to any particular circumfcription of fpace. Thefe properties fubfift, in created nature, under a great variety of fenfible forms. Alfo every animated being has its fenforium, that is, a certain portion of fpace, within which perception and volition are exerted.