Chapter Three argues that Kant used two different conceptions of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. The first, the explicit view given in the discussion of primacy, I call “the priority of belief”. Here claims arising from the needs of practical reason, chiefly the postulates, must be integrated by theoretical reason into one coherent set of beliefs about reality. The second, the implicit view given in scattered places such as examples of moral decision-making, I call “the priority of action”. When the moral agent is faced with a moral decision, the practical interest in determining action ignores and even trumps any theoretical claims. I show that the priority of action fits best with the domain of ethics as free acts. The fact of reason fits with this emphasis on the agent-perspective because it is the awareness of an act of reason – the act of generating the categorical imperative when agents deliberate. This awareness in the empirical moral agent brings with it a belief in freedom, not of the agent’s power of choice but of her reason in determining choice. Reason in the empirical agent is acting during moral deliberation.