Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Foreword
- Introduction
- 1 Radicalizing Warfare: The German Command and the Failure of Operation Barbarossa
- 2 Urban Warfare Doctrine on the Eastern Front
- 3 The Wehrmacht in the War of Ideologies: The Army and Hitler's Criminal Orders on the Eastern Front
- 4 “The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million”: The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941
- 5 The Radicalization of German Occupation Policies: The Wirtschaftsstab Ost and the 121st Infantry Division in Pavlovsk, 1941
- 6 The Exploitation of Foreign Territories and the Discussion of Ostland's Currency in 1941
- 7 Axis Collaboration, Operation Barbarossa, and the Holocaust in Ukraine
- 8 The Radicalization of Anti-Jewish Policies in Nazi-Occupied Belarus
- 9 The Minsk Experience: German Occupiers and Everyday Life in the Capital of Belarus
- 10 Extending the Genocidal Program: Did Otto Ohlendorf Initiate the Systematic Extermination of Soviet “Gypsies”?
- 11 The Development of German Policy in Occupied France, 1941, against the Backdrop of the War in the East
- Conclusion: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization
- Appendix: Comparative Table of Ranks for 1941
- Selected Bibliography
- List of Contributors
- Index
1 - Radicalizing Warfare: The German Command and the Failure of Operation Barbarossa
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Foreword
- Introduction
- 1 Radicalizing Warfare: The German Command and the Failure of Operation Barbarossa
- 2 Urban Warfare Doctrine on the Eastern Front
- 3 The Wehrmacht in the War of Ideologies: The Army and Hitler's Criminal Orders on the Eastern Front
- 4 “The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million”: The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941
- 5 The Radicalization of German Occupation Policies: The Wirtschaftsstab Ost and the 121st Infantry Division in Pavlovsk, 1941
- 6 The Exploitation of Foreign Territories and the Discussion of Ostland's Currency in 1941
- 7 Axis Collaboration, Operation Barbarossa, and the Holocaust in Ukraine
- 8 The Radicalization of Anti-Jewish Policies in Nazi-Occupied Belarus
- 9 The Minsk Experience: German Occupiers and Everyday Life in the Capital of Belarus
- 10 Extending the Genocidal Program: Did Otto Ohlendorf Initiate the Systematic Extermination of Soviet “Gypsies”?
- 11 The Development of German Policy in Occupied France, 1941, against the Backdrop of the War in the East
- Conclusion: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization
- Appendix: Comparative Table of Ranks for 1941
- Selected Bibliography
- List of Contributors
- Index
Summary
“Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” Thus remarked the renowned Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War. Casting a fleeting look at the respective strength of arms, experience, and professionalism of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, one might be forgiven for thinking that on this occasion the ensuing war would indeed be very simple, even easy. Certainly many at the time thought so, yet deficient German planning and dogged Soviet resistance proved the virtue of Clausewitz's maxim. Indeed, from its very inception Operation Barbarossa was a problematic enterprise based on poor intelligence and an erroneous understanding of warfare in eastern Europe. Hitler's Ostheer (Eastern army) soon encountered problems, and a drastic cycle of improvisation forced a radicalization in tactical methods and strategic choices. At the tactical level, radicalization manifested itself in the increasingly arduous experience of warfare as dangerous materiel shortages, unceasing operational demands, and unprecedented losses overwhelmed units. At the strategic level, the radicalization stemmed from the failure of German plans to rapidly end Soviet resistance, leading to the command crisis over how best to continue the war. Certainly Hitler's war in the east was in many ways unique, but in military terms the Wehrmacht's problems were prefaced by past campaigns.
In his biography of Charles XII of Sweden, Voltaire noted that “there is no ruler who, in reading the life of Charles XII, should not be cured of the folly of conquest.”
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization, pp. 19 - 44Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2012