Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-4hvwz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-29T06:30:54.875Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Neoconservatives and the Reagan Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Murray Friedman
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
Get access

Summary

The 1972 election marked a turning point in the evolution into neoconservatives of some of the Democratic liberals. Until then, except for Kristol, who had voted for Nixon in 1968, and Moynihan, who had entered the Nixon administration, the neocons had remained loyal Democrats. Since the start of the Cold War, they had supported hard-line anticommunism and strong national defense, which had generally been endorsed by both political parties.

In the view of most neocons, McGovern, a former Henry Wallace supporter, turned his back on this tradition in his 1972 campaign. His call for cooperation with the Soviet Union ignored, or at least minimized, what they perceived as the perils posed by that country's aggressive designs in the world. They were deeply suspicious of a candidate for president who charged that American foreign policy was based on “outdated stereotypes of military confrontation and power politics.” Indeed, these disgruntled liberals were convinced that the McGovernites had hijacked their party and jettisoned liberalism as they had known it.

Although McGovern lost forty-nine of the fifty states and was finished politically, his dovish views resonated within important elements of America's intellectual and cultural elite. The Cold War had been waged as a siege in Europe and as a series of duels elsewhere, chiefly in Korea and Indochina. The Nixon administration's policy of détente had accommodated the status quo by relying heavily on a huge build-up of nuclear weapons by both the United States and the USSR to maintain the peace.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Neoconservative Revolution
Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy
, pp. 137 - 160
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×