The nuclear revolution undercut the classical logic of war. The stylized relation that appeared to link the use or threatened use of force to states' attempts to secure their interests before the nuclear revolution no longer seems to apply. Explaining how that relation has changed and the consequences of that change is the task of nuclear deterrence theory. By tracing the search for credibility, the preceding chapters have tried to present a general and unifying perspective on the ways that nuclear deterrence theory has tried to understand and explain this relation. This perspective seeks to provide a context in which questions about the relation between force and states' political objectives in the nuclear age can be asked more precisely and related more carefully and clearly to other aspects of this relation. This chapter summarizes the previous discussion and offers an appraisal of it.

The review begins with the nuclear revolution, the challenge it posed, and the general approach that nuclear deterrence theory has taken toward linking force to political objectives after the nuclear revolution. There follows a technical summary and critique of the models and the findings based on them. Finally, this appraisal takes a step back from the models to discuss the problem of evidence, or rather the lack thereof, and the inherent difficulty in assessing or evaluating nuclear deterrence theory empirically.

The stylized classical logic of war assumed that punitive and defensive capabilities were conflated.