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7 - “Hegelian” arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Graham Oppy
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
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Summary

I am not confident that what I have to say in this section is an accurate representation of the thought of Hegel, or of any subsequent Hegelians. However, what I provide is a characterization of certain kinds of a priori arguments for the existence of God that might perhaps be arrived at on the basis of a reading of some of the work of, say, R. G. Collingwood or E. E. Harris. There are three kinds of arguments: (i) an argument that, albeit tendentiously, can be traced back to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; (ii) an argument that can be traced back to some ideas in Plato; and (iii) an argument that can be traced back to some ideas in Husserl and other continental phenomenologists.

THE NEO-KANTIAN ARGUMENT

In this section, I discuss an argument that can be traced back to Kant. This argument is a kind of transcendental deduction of the existence of God. In presenting this argument, I draw on Harris (1972X1977), though I doubt that he would approve of the use that I have made of his work.

In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant provides the materials for an a priori proof of the necessity of belief in the existence of God. Very roughly, this argument goes as follows:

  1. Perception of objects is possible only as a result of an a priori synthesis under the categories and the pure forms of intuition. (Premise)

  2. […]

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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  • “Hegelian” arguments
  • Graham Oppy, Australian National University, Canberra
  • Book: Ontological Arguments and Belief in God
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663840.010
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  • “Hegelian” arguments
  • Graham Oppy, Australian National University, Canberra
  • Book: Ontological Arguments and Belief in God
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663840.010
Available formats
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  • “Hegelian” arguments
  • Graham Oppy, Australian National University, Canberra
  • Book: Ontological Arguments and Belief in God
  • Online publication: 05 May 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663840.010
Available formats
×