This is an expanded and rewritten version of my doctoral dissertation at UCLA. In retrospect, it is curious how much it is a brainchild of the general intellectual atmosphere at the time of writing and my attending classes. When I first took an interest in the problems of how institutional arrangements deal with transaction and information cost problems it seemed that almost everyone there, without any explicit agreement or understanding, was working on similar or related issues. If there is anything of merit in the following, it should be looked at as a tribute to my teachers–especially A. A. Alchian, H. Demsetz, J. Hirshleifer, A. Leijonhufvud, and E. Thompson. It was an exciting time to be a student there, and I am grateful for the lasting influences that these people have had on my thinking.

My greatest debt is to A. Leijonhufvud. He originally aroused my interest in the open field system in his lectures on economic history, and contributed to the shaping of my final, or at least current, ideas on the topic. Without his continued support, this study might never have been published.

Several other people have read and commented on this work. I am especially grateful to Professor E. Searle for putting up with an economist's sometimes appalling naiveté with respect to historical reality and the work of historians. The interest shown in my work by Professors J. Hirshleifer and D. Shetier was a constant spur to me, and I am greatly indebted to them.