Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Map 1 The West Indies Station, 1812–15
- Map 2 The North American Station, 1812-15
- Introduction
- Part I Authority’s Tools for Creating Order
- Part II Creating ‘Disorder’
- Part III The Responses to ‘Disorder’
- Conclusions
- Appendix A The Ships in the Sample, the Expected Complements, Their Officers and the Time Period the Officers Were in Command, within the Study
- Appendix B Tables
- Works Cited
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Map 1 The West Indies Station, 1812–15
- Map 2 The North American Station, 1812-15
- Introduction
- Part I Authority’s Tools for Creating Order
- Part II Creating ‘Disorder’
- Part III The Responses to ‘Disorder’
- Conclusions
- Appendix A The Ships in the Sample, the Expected Complements, Their Officers and the Time Period the Officers Were in Command, within the Study
- Appendix B Tables
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
The overall picture aboard the ships of the Royal Navy on the North American and West Indies Station during the War of 1812 is one of relative order, established and maintained by the officers representing naval authority, as directed from the Admiralty in London. The methods used to establish order created a multi-layered system of written forms and physical practices. Much depended on the officer's individual response to his situation, including the ship's crew, the ship and the system itself. Within the relatively smooth operation of the navy, a series of actions undermined the order established by authority. This final chapter draws conclusions in three areas: the means by which order was established and maintained; the nature and extent of ‘disorder’, and authority's response to attempts at undermining order.
Establishing Authority's Order
The Admiralty continued to extend its control over the operation of the Royal Navy throughout the War of 1812. The Regulations and Instructions of 1806/8 did not simply represent an effort to increase financial accountability for the great expenditure that the navy constituted, as suggested by Lavery, nor were they simply an infusion of Christian morality into shipboard life. The 1806 revision had a more developed set of rules and procedures that provided a set of standards concerning the operation and organization of His Majesty's ships and vessels. Mistakes, oversights, and efforts to skirt the requirements brought a swift response, seeking prompt correction, often with the section and article cited from the omnipotent Regulations and Instructions. With so many written directives, most captains, if not all, would eventually run into some problem with their superior officers over their instructions. The Regulations and Instructions and the Admiralty's additional orders and instructions demonstrate the continued bureaucratization of government at this time in British history. This supports the notion of the expanding central control of naval administration advanced by Wilkinson, Brewer, Morriss, Davey, Baugh and Knight.
One significant area of centralization was the Admiralty's domination over the patronage system of the local flag officers and their junior commanding officers. Chapter 2 demonstrated the heavy assault on the old patronage system throughout the War of 1812. Officers could seldom place their followers without the proper backing of the Admiralty in London.
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- Order and Disorder in the British Navy, 1793-1815Control, Resistance, Flogging and Hanging, pp. 221 - 240Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2016