3 - Place
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 October 2009
Summary
When, at the opening of Physics III, 1, Aristotle lists those things without which motion seems to be impossible, the infinite appears first, followed by place, void, and time. He examines the infinite after completing his account of motion (Physics III, 4–8). I omit examination of it here for two reasons. (1) As noted earlier, the infinite, place, void, and time are subordinated to the definitions of motion and nature, but they are not subordinated to one another. Thus it is not necessary to examine the infinite in order to examine place and void. (2) Furthermore, the infinite plays a largely negative role in the order of nature. There is no such thing as an infinite magnitude, and indeed the being of the infinite is matter and even privation (Physics III, 7, 207a35, 208a). However, when Aristotle identifies the infinite with matter and privation, he anticipates his account of place in an important way.
As matter or privation, the infinite is identified with what is surrounded rather than with what surrounds, which is form (207a35–36; 208a3–4). Place, as we shall see, is not itself form, but strongly resembles form: both are limits (Physics IV, 4, 211b13). Ultimately, Aristotle defines place as the first unmoved limit of that which surrounds (212a20–21). As I shall argue, place, as a first limit, serves as a cause of order: it renders the cosmos determinate in respect to “where things are and are moved.”
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- Information
- The Order of Nature in Aristotle's PhysicsPlace and the Elements, pp. 66 - 121Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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