The Allied initiative of 15 April 1922 had in fact been shrewdly judged. After consultation with Moscow, Chicherin returned to the discussions with a more accommodating response. He saw Wise on 19 April and gave a verbal outline of the Soviet reply, and then on 20 April, together with Litvinov and Krasin, he brought the draft reply to Lloyd George's private residence. The Soviet note, Lloyd George commented, was unacceptable in a number of respects: war debts would have to be ‘written down’ rather than ‘written off’, and there would have to be some provision for the restitution of private property or for an appropriate form of compensation. It was essential, the prime minister pointed out, to get the City of London to support them; otherwise credits would not be forthcoming. He understood the delegation's political difficulties; all that was asked for, however, was that compensation should be paid if restitution was impossible. This would not interfere with the principles upon which the Soviet system was based. Apart from the United States, there were three countries in which a Russian loan could be raised. The first was Britain, where government guarantees for foreign trade and exports were available. Belgium, a very rich country with no war debts and flourishing industries, would certainly assist, and perhaps also France, provided some method of restitution or compensation was agreed. The more countries that were involved, the less the loan would cost.