Let us now examine the tendencies toward extremism, or lack of same, among the upward of 130 million Muslims of India, the third largest population of Muslims after those of Indonesia and Pakistan. The question immediately arises: excluding the unique circumstances of Kashmir, why has not this Muslim population engaged in terrorism as have those from Saudi Arabia (al-Qaeda), Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Group), Algeria (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)), or even Britain (al-Muhajiroun).

An immediate answer lies in the obvious non-conformity of Indian Muslim history to the pattern of Figure 1.1. The Muslim population, subordinate under the British, has continued in a minority status, in certain respects (e.g., economically) also subordinate to the majority Hindus after Indian independence in 1947. Certainly there has been no Muslim ascendancy, ephemeral or otherwise, and losses have been incurred but on a sporadic basis, such as the 1984 intrusion of the Indian Supreme Court in Islamic personal law, the riots and Muslim deaths after the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992, or the rise to power of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The workings of Indian democracy have mostly reversed these Muslim losses, as in the limits imposed on the government's ability to regulate personal Islamic law, the prevention of additional attacks on Muslim holy places, and the decline in the political fortunes of the BJP. Communal strife still exists, but it is generally local in nature and does not reflect state policy, the most dangerous condition for threatened minorities.