Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 The paradox of predictivism
- Chapter 2 Epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 3 Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements
- Chapter 4 Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism
- Chapter 5 The predicting community
- Chapter 6 Back to epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 7 Postlude on old evidence
- Chapter 8 A paradox resolved
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 8 - A paradox resolved
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 The paradox of predictivism
- Chapter 2 Epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 3 Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements
- Chapter 4 Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism
- Chapter 5 The predicting community
- Chapter 6 Back to epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 7 Postlude on old evidence
- Chapter 8 A paradox resolved
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
This book began with the observation that predictivism is, prima facie, a paradoxical thesis. By this point any appearance of paradox has fully disappeared. In this chapter I offer a concise summary of the central theses of this book, and what I take to be its contributions to the philosophy of science. These theses fall into three main areas: confirmation theory, the realist/anti-realist debate, and the methodology of science. I deal with each in turn.
CONFIRMATION THEORY
One central claim has been that the phenomenon of predictivism is a real one in scientific theory evaluation and that it takes on a variety of forms. The virtuous/unvirtuous distinction intersects with the tempered/thin distinction to produce four forms of predictivism – and there is considerable reason to think that a typical scientific community will have members that instantiate more than one form (Chapter 3).
My term ‘unvirtuous predictivism’ refers to a phenomenon which resembles something well charted in the philosophical literature. This refers to the tendency to view the accommodator (but not the predictor) with a certain kind of suspicion, as though the accommodator were something like a Popperian pseudoscientist – one who endorses too highly theories that have been built to fit some salient body of evidence (or endorsed because they fit this evidence). Something resembling this view is well articulated by, e.g., Lipton (2004: Ch. 10). However, the term ‘virtuous predictivism’ refers to a thus far relatively unnoted phenomenon.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Paradox of Predictivism , pp. 240 - 245Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008