Symbolically, the summit at Cairo formalized Chongqing's partnership with the Western Allies in prosecuting the war and in planning for peace. Practically, however, the Cairo Conference did not result in the definite American–Chinese alliance sought by the KMT leadership. At Cairo, exposure of the difficulties in Chongqing's relations with the Allies did not result in the alteration of Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward cooperation with the United States. Actually, the experience only made him more anxious than ever to maintain the momentum of the wartime Chinese–American partnership. Nevertheless, the anticlimax of the Chongqing–Washington military cooperation in war came in 1944. In that summer, amid the KMT regime's military disaster inflicted by Japan's new offensive, the U.S. government pressed Chiang Kai-shek to delegate the command of the Chinese Army to General Joseph Stilwell. Chiang's stubborn resistance to the pressure eventually resulted in Stilwell's departure from the China theater. The Stilwell affair showed Chiang's intractable character whenever he sensed a threat to his power. Yet, strangely, Chiang's defense of his sovereign status in the command crisis unfolded along with Chongqing's retreat on the diplomatic front as far as postwar East Asia was concerned. When President Roosevelt saw no other choice but to recall General Stilwell from China, the State Department realized that in international affairs Chongqing was becoming more manageable than before.