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7 - Toward the Primacy of Responsibility

from Part II - Facing a New Direction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2017

Douglas Den Uyl
Affiliation:
Liberty Fund, Inc.
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Summary

To say that you have a reason is to say something relational, something which implies the existence of another, at least another self. It announces that you have a claim on that other, or acknowledges her claim on you. For normative claims are not the claims of a metaphysical world of values on us; they are claims we make on ourselves and each other.

Christine M. Korsgaard, “The Reason We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent- Neutral Values,” Social Philosophy & Policy

In order to fully grasp the exact character of individualistic perfectionism, we think it is worthwhile to contrast the theory we have developed with the thought of two very important philosophers: Stephen Darwall and Mark LeBar. We have chosen these thinkers because they are, in some fashion or other, advocates of constructivism— that is to say, the metaethical view that evaluative or normative claims are seen as true or false because they are based on principles that are constructions of moral thought, and not because they are discovered, detected, or grounded in anything real apart from such thought. We have benefited from considering these thinkers, because they have been instrumental in our clarifying the ways in which the individualist perfectionist position we hold stands apart. What follows indicates some of our reflections and conclusions in this regard.

Darwall

We take the works of Stephen Darwall to be one of the most prominent examples of the paradigm of respect. Anyone familiar with Darwall's work has learned from it, and we ourselves have come to understand our own views better in light of it. It would be folly to suppose that we could provide a full analysis of Darwall's views here. Instead, we seek to contrast some of his major tenets with our own, more as a way of further clarifying our own position, and less as a criticism of Darwall. The spirit with which we undertake the following reflections is thus one of illumination rather than depreciation.

There seem to be three major points of comparison between Darwall's work and our own.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Perfectionist Turn
From Metanorms to Metaethics
, pp. 246 - 283
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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