Phenomenology is always the name for the procedure of ontology, which essentially distinguishes itself from all other, positive sciences.

It is true that someone engaged in research can master, in addition to his own positive science, phenomenology as well, or at least follow its steps and investigations. But philosophical knowledge can become genuinely relevant and fertile for his own positive science only when, within the problematic which stems from deliberation on the ontic correlations in his area, he comes upon the basic traditional concepts and, furthermore, questions their suitability for that which is made the theme of his science. Then, proceeding from the demands of his science and from the horizon of his own scientific inquiry, which lies, so to speak, on the frontiers of his basic concepts, he can search back for the original ontological constitution of that which is to remain and become anew the object of his science. The questions which arise in this way methodically thrust beyond themselves insofar as that which they are asking is accessible and determinable only through ontology.