It is strikingly apparent that the twentieth century has been a golden one for the sort of philosophy that is logically and empirically oriented. Merely to list the names of the analytical philosophers who have achieved greatness or near-greatness in this century is to provide impressive evidence of this: Russell and Wittgenstein (who stand on a level by themselves); G. E. Moore (whose influence Keynes described so well in the lovely memoir ‘My Early Beliefs’); F. P. Ramsey (also memorialized by Keynes); Carnap and Reichenbach; John Austin; and – to take the risk of mentioning some philosophers in mid-career – W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman. The writings of these men have illuminated field after field of philosophy: ethics (Moore); mathematical philosophy (Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine); epistemology and philosophy of science (all of the figures mentioned). The nature of moral valuation; of natural laws; of mathematical necessity; the nature of language and its relation to reality; of truth and meaning; of common sense knowledge and of scientific knowledge; and above all, the nature of philosophy itself, have been the subject of essays and books as brilliant, as full of insights and surprises (including surprising mistakes, naturally) as any produced in the entire history of philosophy. If any further evidence were needed of the healthy state of philosophy today, it would be provided by the hordes of intellectuals who complain that philosophy is overly ‘technical’, that it has ‘abdicated’ from any concern with ‘real’ problems etc.