Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures and GIS Maps
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- I INTRODUCTION
- 1 Intellectual Property and the State
- 2 Regulating the Quality of Enforcement
- II THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE: IPR ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS
- III THE STATE IN ACTION: THE POLITICS OF IPR ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA
- IV CONCLUSION
- Glossary of Selected Chinese Terms
- Index
2 - Regulating the Quality of Enforcement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures and GIS Maps
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- I INTRODUCTION
- 1 Intellectual Property and the State
- 2 Regulating the Quality of Enforcement
- II THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE: IPR ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS
- III THE STATE IN ACTION: THE POLITICS OF IPR ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA
- IV CONCLUSION
- Glossary of Selected Chinese Terms
- Index
Summary
In the United States, media outlets, business groups, and the government have all fueled the popular misconception that high rates of piracy and counterfeiting in China persist because of the lack of enforcement of IPR laws. Over the last two decades, the U.S. media have provided the public a steady stream of stories about Chinese factories that churn out pirated software and counterfeit Nike shoes. The bottom line of such reports is the same: too little enforcement. Business groups similarly bemoan the insufficient enforcement of IPR laws in China. In addition, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative never fails to emphasize in its annual reports on piracy that the Chinese government should provide more enforcement of IPR laws. The message is loud and clear: the easy way to fix the problem is to step up enforcement. Yet the solution is not so simple. Controlling for population, China already has the highest volume of IPR enforcement in the world. Strikingly, this enforcement has not led to an appreciable drop in piracy and counterfeiting. Why? The main problem with the current enforcement structure in China is that high-quality enforcement is the exception, whereas low-quality enforcement is still the norm.
Why does low-quality enforcement persist in China? This chapter develops a theoretical argument that stresses the mutually reinforcing impact of two variables: bureaucratic organization and pressure to enforce.
Two aspects of bureaucratic organization can impact enforcement: administrative decentralization and jurisdictional ambiguity. Some bureaucracies responsible for IPR enforcement are decentralized, whereas others are not.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Piracy and the StateThe Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China, pp. 33 - 68Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009