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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

James Raymond Vreeland
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Axel Dreher
Affiliation:
Universität Heidelberg
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  • References
  • James Raymond Vreeland, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Axel Dreher, Universität Heidelberg
  • Book: The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139027755.008
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  • References
  • James Raymond Vreeland, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Axel Dreher, Universität Heidelberg
  • Book: The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139027755.008
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  • References
  • James Raymond Vreeland, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Axel Dreher, Universität Heidelberg
  • Book: The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139027755.008
Available formats
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