Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Protest and Regimes
- 2 Protest and Regime in Russia
- 3 The Geography of Strikes
- 4 A Time for Trouble
- 5 Elections and the Decline of Protest
- 6 Vladimir Putin and Defeat-Proofing the System
- 7 Protest, Repression, and Order from Below
- 8 Implications for Russia and Elsewhere
- Bibliography
- Appendix 1 Event Protocol
- Appendix 2 Sectoral and Seasonal Strike Patterns
- Appendix 3 A Statistical Approach to Political Relations
- Index
Appendix 3 - A Statistical Approach to Political Relations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Protest and Regimes
- 2 Protest and Regime in Russia
- 3 The Geography of Strikes
- 4 A Time for Trouble
- 5 Elections and the Decline of Protest
- 6 Vladimir Putin and Defeat-Proofing the System
- 7 Protest, Repression, and Order from Below
- 8 Implications for Russia and Elsewhere
- Bibliography
- Appendix 1 Event Protocol
- Appendix 2 Sectoral and Seasonal Strike Patterns
- Appendix 3 A Statistical Approach to Political Relations
- Index
Summary
In Chapter 3, I gave some theoretical reasons why it is unlikely that protest activity is driving the quality of governors' relations with Moscow, and why it is much more plausible to assume that the opposite story, the one told in this book, is true. In Table A3.1, I present powerful statistical support for this view.
In Model 1, I test a range of hypotheses in which political relations are determined by a combination of structural factors (republic or capital status) and political factors. The political factors are whether the governor is supported by the Communists (as measured using data from Gimpelson and Treisman 2002), levels of support for Yeltsin in the region in 1993 (as expressed in the referendum of that year on confidence in the President), and the change in the level of support between 1993 and 1996 (as measured by the difference between the vote for Yeltsin in the first round of the 1996 Presidential election and the 1993 referendum). I also include the MFK measure of ethnic conflict potential (with the scale reversed to represent ethnic peace) and their measure of elite stability. The results are impressive. Without including any measure of protest, we explain 60 percent of the variance in the seventy-eight observations. The single most important factor driving relations between the regions and the Kremlin, as we might expect, is whether the governor is a Communist or not.
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- Information
- The Politics of Protest in Hybrid RegimesManaging Dissent in Post-Communist Russia, pp. 275 - 278Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010