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11 - Unfinished story

Rod Girle
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
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Summary

A budget of heresy

I have declared or argued for several quite heretical things. First, I declared in favour of the status of first-order modal logic as an artificial language. I then gave examples that show that the language of classical logic is unreliable for the evaluation of many arguments couched in ordinary language. It was urged that more attention should be paid to the logic–language relationship. Modal logic is more reliable for some argument evaluation than non-modal logic. But we saw that there is much beyond the scope of present modal logic – the present logic of boxes and diamonds.

I argued for a renewed look at the whole question of existential import for both quantifiers and names. An appeal was made to ordinary intuitions and sensible talk of the properties of nonexistent entities. McGinn effectively denies Parmenides' law as he writes:

It may now be asked how we can ascribe any properties to purely intentional objects, including the property of non-existence. Here we need to heed carefully the way we actually talk and not impose misleading models on our concepts. For we simply do ascribe properties to non-existent objects – we make remarks about them. Thus we say that Pegasus is a horse not a pig, the Zeus is the senior god, that Sherlock Holmes is a brilliant detective. These statement are all true and they contain predicative expressions; so, yes, we can predicate properties of non-existent entities.

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Possible Worlds , pp. 191 - 194
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2003

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  • Unfinished story
  • Rod Girle, University of Auckland
  • Book: Possible Worlds
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653454.012
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  • Unfinished story
  • Rod Girle, University of Auckland
  • Book: Possible Worlds
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653454.012
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Unfinished story
  • Rod Girle, University of Auckland
  • Book: Possible Worlds
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653454.012
Available formats
×