Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction: Varieties of Practical Conflict and the Scope of Practical Reason
- 2 Willing the Law
- 3 The Myth of Egoism
- 4 Thinking about Conflicts of Desire
- 5 Putting Together Morality and Well-Being
- 6 The Second Worst in Practical Conflict
- 7 Personal Practical Conflicts
- 8 Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret
- 9 Conflicting Values and Conflicting Virtues
- 10 Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason
- 11 Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control
- 12 Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts?
- 13 Moral Dilemmas of Transitional Justice
- 14 Do Conflicts Make Us Free?
- List of Contributors
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
1 - Introduction: Varieties of Practical Conflict and the Scope of Practical Reason
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction: Varieties of Practical Conflict and the Scope of Practical Reason
- 2 Willing the Law
- 3 The Myth of Egoism
- 4 Thinking about Conflicts of Desire
- 5 Putting Together Morality and Well-Being
- 6 The Second Worst in Practical Conflict
- 7 Personal Practical Conflicts
- 8 Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret
- 9 Conflicting Values and Conflicting Virtues
- 10 Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason
- 11 Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control
- 12 Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts?
- 13 Moral Dilemmas of Transitional Justice
- 14 Do Conflicts Make Us Free?
- List of Contributors
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Summary
Practical conflicts pervade human life. They arise in various domains, take many different forms, and pose a challenge, in varying degrees and intensities, to the rationally deliberating agent.
In this collection, analyses of practical conflicts in the various forms and domains in which they arise are gathered together for the first time. The aim is to provide a comprehensive basis for understanding their exact sources, the challenge they therefore pose to an adequate conception of practical reason, and how (ultimately) this challenge can be met – if, in fact, it can be met. Practical conflicts thereby provide a lens through which questions about the scope of practical reason come into focus.
There are many different reasons for action that can conflict with one another. The list of items that give rise to potentially conflicting reasons is long and might even appear open-ended. Consider, for example: desires, preferences, emotions, interests, goals, plans, commitments, values, virtues, obligations, and moral norms. After all, agents have many different desires, goals, and values; they subscribe to a variety of ideals and principles and accept different normative or moral commitments. Because all these different reasons are action-guiding claims, we call conflicts between them “practical conflicts.” In contrast, the conflicts that arise, for example, between scientific theories and contradictory empirical evidence are often described as “theoretical” – having more to do with reasons to believe something and leaving the connection with action rather remote.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Practical ConflictsNew Philosophical Essays, pp. 1 - 26Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004