Book contents
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- Note
- ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PROPOSITIONS REFERRED TO BY NAMES
- INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION
- INTRODUCTION
- CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS OF IDEAS AND NOTATIONS
- CHAPTER II THE THEORY OF LOGICAL TYPES
- CHAPTER III INCOMPLETE SYMBOLS
- PART I MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
- PART II PROLEGOMENA TO CARDINAL ARITHMETIC
- APPENDIX A The Theory of Deduction for Propositions containing Apparent Variables
- APPENDIX C Truth-Functions and others
- LIST OF DEFINITIONS
CHAPTER II - THE THEORY OF LOGICAL TYPES
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- Note
- ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PROPOSITIONS REFERRED TO BY NAMES
- INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION
- INTRODUCTION
- CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS OF IDEAS AND NOTATIONS
- CHAPTER II THE THEORY OF LOGICAL TYPES
- CHAPTER III INCOMPLETE SYMBOLS
- PART I MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
- PART II PROLEGOMENA TO CARDINAL ARITHMETIC
- APPENDIX A The Theory of Deduction for Propositions containing Apparent Variables
- APPENDIX C Truth-Functions and others
- LIST OF DEFINITIONS
Summary
The theory of logical types, to be explained in the present Chapter, recommended itself to us in the first instance by its ability to solve certain contradictions, of which the one best known to mathematicians is Burali-Forti's concerning the greatest ordinal. But the theory in question is not wholly dependent upon this indirect recommendation: it has also a certain consonance with common sense which makes it inherently credible. In what follows, we shall therefore first set forth the theory on its own account, and then apply it to the solution of the contradictions.
The Vicious-Circle Principle.
An analysis of the paradoxes to be avoided shows that they all result from a certain kind of vicious circle. The vicious circles in question arise from supposing that a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole. Thus, for example, the collection of propositions will be supposed to contain a proposition stating that “all propositions are either true or false.” It would seem, however, that such a statement could not be legitimate unless “all propositions” referred to some already definite collection, which it cannot do if new propositions are created by statements about “all propositions.” We shall, therefore, have to say that statements about “all propositions” are meaningless. More generally, given any set of objects such that, if we suppose the set to have a total, it will contain members which presuppose this total, then such a set cannot have a total.
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- Information
- Principia Mathematica to *56 , pp. 37 - 65Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997
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