Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What is free will?
- 3 Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- 4 A glaring absurdity
- 5 Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- 6 A wretched subterfuge
- 7 The quagmire of evasion
- 8 Of puppies and polyps
- 9 Two overridden and wearied nags
- 10 Whither free will?
- Further reading: a personal top ten
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What is free will?
- 3 Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- 4 A glaring absurdity
- 5 Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- 6 A wretched subterfuge
- 7 The quagmire of evasion
- 8 Of puppies and polyps
- 9 Two overridden and wearied nags
- 10 Whither free will?
- Further reading: a personal top ten
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I shall look at two potential obstacles to the libertarian's view that, in order for us to be free and responsible agents, our future must be physically open – a “garden of forking paths”, as it has been described. The first obstacle is an argument by Harry Frankfurt designed to refute what he terms the “principle of alternate possibilities”. The second obstacle is the special theory of relativity, which appears to imply that the future simply cannot be a garden of forking paths.
The principle of alternate possibilities
Practically no one … seems inclined to deny or even to question that the principle of alternate possibilities (construed in some way or other) is true. It has generally seemed so overwhelmingly plausible that some philosophers have even characterized it as an a priori truth. People whose accounts of free will or of moral responsibility are radically at odds evidently find in it a firm and convenient common ground upon which they can profitably take their opposing stands.
Harry FrankfurtWhen I accept moral responsibility for an act of mine I am admitting that I knew the likely moral consequences of the act before I carried it out and, knowing this, that I freely chose to carry out that act. Implicit in this is the understanding that I could have refrained from carrying out the act. I could have done otherwise. And if I could not have refrained from carrying out the act, if I could not have done otherwise, then I cannot be held responsible for my act.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Problem of Free WillA Contemporary Introduction, pp. 59 - 86Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2012