Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gq7q9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T08:26:28.818Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2010

Christophe P. Chamley
Affiliation:
Boston University
Get access

Summary

Penguins are social animals. They live in groups above the water from which they get fish for food. Unfortunately, there is more than fish in the water. From time to time, killer whales (orcas) roam under the surface waiting for some prey. Penguins are aware of the danger and would like to have some information before taking a plunge. Indeed, any sensible penguin thinks that it would be very nice if some other penguin would dive first to test the water. So what is a penguin to do? Wait. Possibly someother member of the colony who is more hungry, or has other information, will go first. Is it possible that no penguin will ever go? No, because waiting becomes more costly as hunger increases. Eventually, one or more penguins will take the plunge, and, depending on the outcome, the others will either stay put or follow en masse. This waiting game is socially inefficient. It would be better if the first individual would decide to go at least a bit earlier: the first to go is, on the margin, as well off going just a little earlier; but others strictly prefer him to go a little earlier. Actually, the penguins are well aware of this social inefficiency, which they try to remedy by pushing some poor fellow off the cliff.

First-Cousin Marriages

There is a long-standing taboo against marriages between first cousins in some parts of the world. Such taboos may entail significant costs. In the United States, about thirty states have laws forbidding first cousins to marry, but on some other continents marriages between cousins are well regarded.

Type
Chapter
Information
Rational Herds
Economic Models of Social Learning
, pp. 1 - 16
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Introduction
  • Christophe P. Chamley, Boston University
  • Book: Rational Herds
  • Online publication: 12 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616372.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
  • Christophe P. Chamley, Boston University
  • Book: Rational Herds
  • Online publication: 12 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616372.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Christophe P. Chamley, Boston University
  • Book: Rational Herds
  • Online publication: 12 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616372.002
Available formats
×