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7 - Embryonic stem cells, vulnerability, and sanctity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2014

Matti Häyry
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
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Summary

In this chapter, I examine two aspects of the morality of human embryonic stem cell research. The first is the role of women in the acquisition of eggs for embryo creation. The second is the moral status of embryos that perish in destructive modes of stem cell research.

What, why, and how regulated?

The possibility of research on human embryos and embryonic stem cells shifts the focus of discussion drastically from making better people (creating new individuals) towards making people better (improving the health of existing individuals). Embryos and their early parts are, if implanted and nurtured properly, capable of developing into adult human beings, but this development is disallowed in most forms of embryo experimentation. The aim of the practice is not reproduction but rather the accumulation of biological and medical knowledge for the benefit of the population.

Embryonic stem cells can be acquired from embryos produced by in vitro fertilisation (IVF), somatic cell nuclear transfer (the Dolly method), or duplication. Although embryos created by IVF for ­fertility treatments but left unused can provide good materials for research, future stem cell treatments would ideally also seem to require cloning by nuclear transfer. Donor stem cells can be rejected by the recipient’s immune system, but this could be prevented by creating an embryonic clone of the patient and harvesting this for therapeutic and ­immunologically compatible stem cells. The difference between ­‘therapeutic’ and ‘reproductive’ cloning would then be that in one the embryo is destroyed to provide a cure and in the other it is implanted to make a baby.

Type
Chapter
Information
Rationality and the Genetic Challenge
Making People Better?
, pp. 146 - 173
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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