Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- 1.1 Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study
- 1.2 Relational exchange: economics and complex contracts
- 1.3 Production functions, transactions costs, and the new institutionalism
- 1.4 The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism
- 1.5 A treatise on the law of marine insurance and general average, volume I
- 1.6 The economics of moral hazard: comment
- 1.7 The economics of moral hazard: further comment
- 1.8 Efficient rent seeking
- Questions and notes on rent seeking
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
1.4 - The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- 1.1 Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study
- 1.2 Relational exchange: economics and complex contracts
- 1.3 Production functions, transactions costs, and the new institutionalism
- 1.4 The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism
- 1.5 A treatise on the law of marine insurance and general average, volume I
- 1.6 The economics of moral hazard: comment
- 1.7 The economics of moral hazard: further comment
- 1.8 Efficient rent seeking
- Questions and notes on rent seeking
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases. In this case there is incentive for sellers to market poor-quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather than to the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a reduction in the average quality of goods and also in the size of the market. It should also be perceived that in these markets social and private returns differ, and therefore, in some cases, governmental intervention may increase the welfare of all parties. Or private institutions may arise to take advantage of the potential increases in welfare which can accrue to all parties. By nature, however, these institutions are nonatomistic, and therefore concentrations of power – with ill consequences of their own – can develop.
The automobile market is used as a finger exercise to illustrate and develop these thoughts. It should be emphasized that this market is chosen for its concreteness and ease in understanding rather than for its importance or realism.
The model with automobiles as an example
The automobiles market
The example of used cars captures the essence of the problem. From time to time one hears either mention of or surprise at the large price difference between new cars and those which have just left the showroom. The usual lunch table justification for this phenomenon is the pure joy of owning a “lnew” car. We offer a different explanation. Suppose (for the sake of clarity rather than reality) that there are just four kinds of cars.
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- Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , pp. 24 - 28Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982
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