Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Realism and Christian faith: towards an ontological approach
- 2 ‘Limping with two different opinions’?
- 3 Taking leave of theological realism
- 4 Realism and Christian faith after Wittgenstein
- 5 The grammar of Christian faith and the relationship between philosophy and theology
- 6 Representation, reconciliation, and the problem of meaning
- 7 God, reality, and realism
- 8 Speaking the reality of God
- 9 Realism: conformed to the conforming word
- References
- Index of scripture references
- Index of names and subjects
5 - The grammar of Christian faith and the relationship between philosophy and theology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Realism and Christian faith: towards an ontological approach
- 2 ‘Limping with two different opinions’?
- 3 Taking leave of theological realism
- 4 Realism and Christian faith after Wittgenstein
- 5 The grammar of Christian faith and the relationship between philosophy and theology
- 6 Representation, reconciliation, and the problem of meaning
- 7 God, reality, and realism
- 8 Speaking the reality of God
- 9 Realism: conformed to the conforming word
- References
- Index of scripture references
- Index of names and subjects
Summary
THE GRAMMAR OF FAITH REVISITED
Neither Phillips's nor Lindbeck's grammatical arguments seem able to yield a theologically coherent account of Christian realism. If these approaches do not work, but, as I argued at the end of chapter 3, we need one which respects the grammar of Christian faith, how are we to argue a case for a realism that does respect this grammar? In the previous chapter I suggested that the grammar of Christian faith is God himself; this is where my proposal parts ways with Wittgenstein and his followers. We saw that for Wittgenstein it is ‘agreement … in form of life’ and ‘in judgements’ (19783: §§241–2) that keeps our practices and our use of particular expressions in order. Hence, when he makes the parenthetical remark ‘Theology as grammar’ (§373), what he means is that theology articulates or uncovers the rules governing language about God as it is used in our practices: it is a clarification of what it makes sense to say about God, how the term ‘God’ is to be used. ‘What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word’ (Wittgenstein quoted by Ambrose 1979: 32). Now, so long as we are confident that we can distinguish blasphemous from reverent Christian language, this might seem to be acceptable.
The problem is that Christians' powers of discrimination are being tested by non-realism and the Sea of Faith Network. Here is a dispute concerning what is ridiculous or blasphemous to say about God.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Realism and Christian FaithGod, Grammar, and Meaning, pp. 108 - 137Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003