Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 The constitutional imperative
- 2 The contractarian vision
- 3 The myth of benevolence
- 4 Modeling the individual for constitutional analysis
- 5 Time temptation, and the constrained future
- 6 Politics without rules, I: Time and nonconstrained collective action
- 7 Rules and justice
- 8 Politics without rules, II: Distributive justice and distributive politics
- 9 Is constitutional revolution possible in democracy?
- Index
Contents
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 The constitutional imperative
- 2 The contractarian vision
- 3 The myth of benevolence
- 4 Modeling the individual for constitutional analysis
- 5 Time temptation, and the constrained future
- 6 Politics without rules, I: Time and nonconstrained collective action
- 7 Rules and justice
- 8 Politics without rules, II: Distributive justice and distributive politics
- 9 Is constitutional revolution possible in democracy?
- Index
Summary
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Reason of RulesConstitutional Political Economy, pp. v - viiiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1986