Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 International Financial Institutions, Development, and Regional Development Banks
- 2 Multilateral Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Underpinnings
- 3 Origins, Politics, and Structure of Regional Development Banks
- 4 RDB Loans and Developing Countries
- 5 Banks or Development Agencies?
- 6 Political and Economic Constraints, Principals and Agents, and Prospects for Development
- Conclusion: Future Outlook
- Appendix 1 Life Expectancy and HDI Rank
- Appendix 2 RDB Shareholders
- Appendix 3 AsDB Professional Staff
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Multilateral Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Underpinnings
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2016
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 International Financial Institutions, Development, and Regional Development Banks
- 2 Multilateral Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Underpinnings
- 3 Origins, Politics, and Structure of Regional Development Banks
- 4 RDB Loans and Developing Countries
- 5 Banks or Development Agencies?
- 6 Political and Economic Constraints, Principals and Agents, and Prospects for Development
- Conclusion: Future Outlook
- Appendix 1 Life Expectancy and HDI Rank
- Appendix 2 RDB Shareholders
- Appendix 3 AsDB Professional Staff
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There are limits to “imbalance” in economic development, to “lack of integration” in research and development, to “fragmentation” in policy making which would be dangerous to pass. And it is clearly impossible to specify in advance the optimal doses of these various policies under different circumstances. The art of promoting economic development, research and development, and constructive policy making in general consists, then, in acquiring a feeling for those doses. This art …. will be mastered far better once the false ideals of “balance,” “coordination,” and “comprehensive overview” have lost our total and unquestioning intellectual allegiance.
– (Albert O. Hirschman and C. E. Lindbolm, Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views, 1962. Reprinted in Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society, 1986, p. 10)How is policy made at multilateral institutions? More specifically, how does the diverse membership of development banks’ governance bodies conduct its decision-making? RDBs display a complexity that is fundamental to understanding not only the way international institutions work, but also why they sometimes do not work so well. As political organizations with governments as members, as institutions with a corporate-like structure and economic goals, and as agents located in different regions with different members and therefore susceptible to different cultural influences, RDBs present a compelling object of research. Moreover, the theoretical findings generated here carry significant contributions to the study of cooperation and international institutions, given the comparative component and institutions’ endurance over time.
Students of international relations have extensively researched the phenomenon of cooperation. Whether it is possible to overcome the noncooperative outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, for example, has been examined in many research projects. Researchers have investigated the best ways to achieve cooperation, overcome the collective action problem, and sustain cooperative endeavors. Scholars have also developed numerous hypotheses seeking to explain the existence of cooperation. Some of the secondary issues studied have been: Do countries cooperate as equal partners? Under what circumstances are they prone to cooperate? And, what sorts of resources are needed to achieve cooperation? International institutions (such as the WB and IMF) represent a strong case of international cooperation that has been examined extensively. They are instances of institutionalized cooperation on a multilateral level, where a country's defection or nonmembership can be costly.
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- Information
- Regional Development Banks in ComparisonBanking Strategies versus Development Goals, pp. 41 - 62Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016