Introduction

The area of non-truth-conditional particle phenomena as discussed by Grice (1975), Karttunen and Peters (1975) and Blakemore (1987) is a relatively new field of research. Little is known about how such phenomena arise, their range of possible functions and their distribution across the languages of the world.

If it is true, as was suggested in chapter 1, that all humans have the same logical abilities, and that communication creates a presumption of adequate contextual effects for the minimum justifiable effort, should we not expect to find in every language similar linguistic phenomena which save the hearer processing effort by guiding him towards the intended range of contextual effects? In other words, could the very fact that humans are constrained by considerations of relevance be the basis for a typology of non-truth-conditional particle phenomena? This chapter is an attempt to show that this could well be the case.

After reviewing some theoretical accounts of non-truth-conditional particles in English, I will look in detail at the behaviour of a variety of such particles. I will discuss at some length the analysis of also in English, auch in German and its equivalent má in Sissala. I will argue that auch and má have a range of functions not shared by also in English, and I will offer an explanation of this fact in relevance-theoretic terms.

Other particles I will look at more briefly are so, after all, you see and even in English, and their equivalents in Sissala. I will try to show that relevance theory sheds light on the analysis of such particles.