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8 - Custom and conscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 October 2009

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Summary

Kehren wir zum Über-ich zurück! Freud

Perspective: of custom

Anthropologists are constantly asked to explain what their subject is specifically about. Following the tradition that goes back to Tylor and Frazer, I take the view that the core of our studies is the fact, the phenomenon, of custom. I find it useful to think of this as a target concept, pointing to what we must aim to understand and explain in anthropological theory, rather than as a fixed conceptual category. To make it clearer I draw attention to the etymologically cognate word ‘costume’ which, like ‘custom’, is ultimately also derived from the Latin consuetudo and does not necessarily mean only attire. Nakedness, remarks Flugel (1930) in his delightful and not yet superseded book on The Psychology of Clothes, can in primitive society be a sign of social status just as at the other extreme special forms of clothing can be of rank and office (pp. 56–7); and this holds equally of course for our own society.

Here the customary use of body decoration as a form of costume, so to speak, halfway between nudity at one end of the scale and head to foot clothing at the other, is enlightening. In the south-eastern Nuba area of the Republic of Sudan, there are still tribal groups amongst whom men normally go completely naked, not even wearing a penis sheath such as is customary in parts of New Guinea, and girls are likewise nude until they become pregnant for the first time.

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Religion, Morality and the Person
Essays on Tallensi Religion
, pp. 175 - 217
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1987

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  • Custom and conscience
  • Meyer Fortes
  • Book: Religion, Morality and the Person
  • Online publication: 13 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557996.009
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  • Custom and conscience
  • Meyer Fortes
  • Book: Religion, Morality and the Person
  • Online publication: 13 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557996.009
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Custom and conscience
  • Meyer Fortes
  • Book: Religion, Morality and the Person
  • Online publication: 13 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557996.009
Available formats
×