After the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, China went into a lockdown, starting in the epicentre of Wuhan and extending to other provinces and localities where local and central governments deemed it appropriate (Plummer and Habich-Sobiegalla forthcoming). After this initial phase, the central government identified border areas as a potential risk and declared a state of emergency to avoid ‘imported cases’. While the emergency level in Beijing was lowered in April 2020 (Xinhua 2020), the level was increased in border areas (Global Times 2020). The Global Times reported that medical personnel were deployed to the Myanmar border area to conduct health monitoring, along with military reinforcements to constantly patrol the border. The threat was supposedly posed by not only ‘illegal’ border crossers, but also Chinese citizens returning from abroad. Accordingly, non-essential border crossings were prohibited, and the issuing of entry and exit permits in border regions was suspended (Global Times 2020). These examples illustrate how border areas and cross-border mobilities continue to be associated with danger and met with extraordinary force. COVID-19 has shown how mobilities that for decades have been considered key to these areas’ global economic integration are in fact securitized, with emergency measures able to specifically target border crossers. However, this situation has also thrown into relief how dependent governments are on their cross-border counterparts in terms of adopting equally appropriate measures and effectively monitoring people's health in the context of a health crisis.