Hegel recognized art and religion, like science, as activities that belong not to “objective” but “absolute” spirit. What he wanted to imply, as I understand him, is that first, they have their objective meaning in themselves and not, as the activities of the serving spheres, in an aim outside the activity; second, that their meaning saves life from Sisyphean absurdity. We can explain that science has such a meaning by its special significance for us. “All men by nature desire to know,” Aristotle said, “as is indicated by the love we have for our senses, even apart from their practical uses.” Whatever we learn about the world is delightful just because it gives knowledge, whether it is useful or even is bad news or not. We just prefer knowledge to ignorance, as we prefer seeing to being blind, even if what we have to see is bad. If also art and religion are absolute spirit, their significance needs to be absolute, that is, independent of their utility as well. Yet what does this mean?

According to some traditional theologians, religion serves the salvation of our souls, hence, has no absolute significance, as it serves an aim outside its activity. If we follow Hegel and our own distinctions, this is a mistake. Yet what is the special utility-independent delight of religious activities? According to Hegel, in both religion and art it is again the delight of knowledge. The knowledge of religion and art is more intuitive, metaphorical, and embedded in practice and less articulate than that of science (that Hegel understands as philosophy, in particular his own) but it is knowledge too.