Book contents
- The Revolution that Failed
- The Revolution that Failed
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Nuclear Revolution Revisited
- 2 The Delicacy of the Nuclear Balance
- 3 Comparative Constitutional Fitness
- 4 Testing the Argument against Its Competitors
- 5 Nixon and the Origins of Renewed Nuclear Competition, 1969–1971
- 6 Nixon, Ford, and Accelerating Nuclear Competition, 1971–1976
- 7 The Rise of Nuclear Warfighting, 1972–1976
- 8 Carter and the Climax of the Arms Race, 1977–1979
- 9 The Revolution that Failed
- Index
2 - The Delicacy of the Nuclear Balance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2020
- The Revolution that Failed
- The Revolution that Failed
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Nuclear Revolution Revisited
- 2 The Delicacy of the Nuclear Balance
- 3 Comparative Constitutional Fitness
- 4 Testing the Argument against Its Competitors
- 5 Nixon and the Origins of Renewed Nuclear Competition, 1969–1971
- 6 Nixon, Ford, and Accelerating Nuclear Competition, 1971–1976
- 7 The Rise of Nuclear Warfighting, 1972–1976
- 8 Carter and the Climax of the Arms Race, 1977–1979
- 9 The Revolution that Failed
- Index
Summary
In 1959, Albert Wohlstetter published one of the most important articles in the history of security studies: “The Delicate Balance of Terror.” The nuclear balance, he worried, “is in fact precarious.” Wohlstetter emphasized that “Deterrence … is not automatic. While feasible, it will be much harder to achieve in the 1960s than is generally believed.” In fact, “the requirements for deterrence are stringent.” Successful retaliation required jumping over six “hurdles,” including: maintaining secure and affordable forces in peacetime, with range to hit the enemy, that were survivable against surprise attack, with secure C3, and that could overcome active and passive defenses. “Prizes for a retaliatory capability,” Wohlstetter observed, “are not distributed for getting over one of these jumps. A system must get over all six.”1
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Revolution that FailedNuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War, pp. 28 - 47Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020