Few topics have attracted more attention in the literature of Roman law than the iusta causa of traditio. The traces of discussion among the Roman jurists found in the famous, or notorious, conflict between D 12.1.18pr and D 41.1.36 indicate that there was room for differences of opinion among them. The conflict itself has provided scope for apparently endless discussion among Romanists, and succeeding generations have sought a solution to what on the evidence of the attempts made since the time of the Glossators, appears to be an insoluble problem. As Oxford has been said to be a home of lost causes, it may be thought peculiarly appropriate to dedicate to a distinguished Oxford Romanist an essay which seeks to offer new perspectives on the iusta causa of traditio. Bold or foolhardy as the essay may be, it is offered with deep respect to a scholar who has guided the footsteps of novices and given enlightenment to more experienced Civilians.

Two observations have prompted the present examination of the iusta causa in traditio. One arises from a consideration of Scots law, and the other from a consideration of the Roman law which, in this matter, Scots law purports to follow. The first observation is that, although Scots law in general follows Roman law in the matter of transfer of property by delivery, iusta causa does not appear to have created the problems which it has for Romanists.