It is testimony to the breadth of thought of Herbert Simon, the man who conceived the idea of ‘satisficing’, that the concept has influenced such a wide variety of disciplines. To name a few: Computer science, game theory, economics, political science, evolutionary biology, and philosophy have all been enriched by reflection on the contrast between choosing what is satisfactory and choosing what is best. Indeed, these disciplines have cross-fertilized one another through the concept. So one finds satisficing computer models of evolutionary development, satisficing economic models of international relations, satisficing applications of game theory within economics, and philosophical accounts of all of these.

Philosophical interest in the concept of satisficing itself represents a convergence. The fecund and appealing idea of choosing what is satisfactory finds a place in the theory of practical reason, or thinking about what to do. The appeal of the concept derives partly from the fact that what is satisfactory is, well, satisfying. Satisfaction is generally good, and goods of this generality feature prominently in any account of practical reason. More noteworthy is the fact that the concept of satisficing finds application from so many perspectives, even within the relatively narrow confines of moral theory.

In any conversation of this complexity it is always in point to ask whether the participants are talking about the same thing. So of course this issue arises with respect to the essays collected in this volume.