Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-sh8wx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T18:00:15.317Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - ‘Similar Fact’ Evidence and Moorov: Time For Rationalisation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2021

Peter Duff
Affiliation:
University of Aberdeen
Pamela R. Ferguson
Affiliation:
University of Dundee
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the operation of so-called ‘similar fact’ evidence in Scots law, the relationship between similar fact and the Moorov doctrine, and the possibility that this relationship has to an extent distorted the use of ‘similar fact’ evidence in our law. It considers the potential for the placing of ‘similar fact’ evidence on a more logical basis. In that context, it examines the proposals of the Scottish Law Commission and asks whether they stand up to scrutiny. Finally, it considers alternatives to the regime suggested by the Scottish Law Commission and offers suggestions for the future direction of the law.

A. ‘SIMILAR FACT’ EVIDENCE IN SCOTS LAW

(1) Background

Scots law has always taken the position that evidence of character is prima facie inadmissible – whether it is the character of an accused, a complainer, a party to a civil case, or indeed a witness – unless an individual's character is itself central to the proceedings, such as that of the pursuer in an action for defamation. The basis of inadmissibility has always been legal irrelevance, in the sense that the evidence is insufficiently relevant to justify the court considering such matters. Yet, despite this exclusionary rule, evidence which happens to reflect incidentally on an accused's character may be admissible if it relates directly to the issue of his guilt. In England, although the law in this area has now been placed on a statutory footing, the heading under which evidence of this kind has traditionally been discussed is that of ‘similar fact’. As will be seen, this is a rather misleading designation, since a great variety of evidence has tended to be grouped under a single label, whether or not it refers to acts of the accused similar to those with which he is now charged. Thus, while Lord Hope in the Privy Council case of S v HMA insists that ‘Scots criminal law has never admitted similar fact evidence’, what he means is that Scots law has never admitted such evidence in the true sense of the term, although other types of evidence which tend to be classified under this heading would certainly be admitted in a Scottish criminal trial.

Type
Chapter
Information
Scottish Criminal Evidence Law
Current Developments and Future Trends
, pp. 97 - 120
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×