Introduction

My aim in this paper is to explore the origins of self- and other-awareness in prelinguistic intentional communication. The study of communication (both human and animal) has long been a “messy” area of inquiry – “messy” in the sense of being a mixture of approaches and definitions. For one thing, the term “communication” itself has proved extremely difficult to define. Indeed, it is common to begin textbooks or chapters on the subject with an explicit recognition of the variety of views on communication (e.g., Slater, 1983; M. S. Dawkins, 1986). In this chapter I will explore an aspect of this variety, one concerning the role granted to mutual awareness in the process of communication. I will contrast two radically different views: one, prevalent until recently in the study of animal behavior, that avoids cognitive processes in the study of communication; the other, popular among students of human communication, that apparently relies upon a multiplicity of cognitive processes. I will then refer to recent attempts to apply the latter approach to animal communication, and will suggest what I think is the proper way to do so. Finally, I will explore the implications of this approach to understand the origins of self-awareness and self-consciousness.

In the multiplicity of approaches to communication, an important dimension seems to be the status given to inner cognitive processes. When communication is studied in animals, cognitive components tend to be ignored, whereas students of human communication seem to overemphasize them.