Virtually all discussions of the relationship between self and society contain some acknowledgment of, and often apology for, the fact that social psychologists have more often considered the impact of social systems on individuals than the impact of individuals on social systems. Integration of knowledge of macrosocial structures and processes, microsocial interaction, and individual psychology is necessary to understand this relationship (House, 1981). In this chapter I sketch the outline of one of the many possible such integrations.

Although in exceptional circumstances, one particular individual can affect social systems, more often than not people affect social systems through their individual decisions to engage collectively in social actions. Hence I focus on an account of individuals' decisions to participate in actions such as social movements. I argue that phenomena such as social movements can be understood fully only by directing explicit attention to the experienced selves of individual actors. Shott (1979), among others, maintains that self-control is an essential component of social control; consistent with her reasoning, I suggest that self-change is an essential component of sustained social change. As Turner (1983) states, “Movements seldom achieve substantial and lasting successes without strong components of personal transformation.” Thus I attempt to identify those forces that impel the self to the redefinitions required to overcome the tendency toward self-definitional and hence social stability. I begin by reviewing sociological social psychological theories of the self and the relationship between self and society, emphasizing how these theories account (or fail to account) for changing selves.