The aim of this chapter is to consider the social and biological functions of shame and the communicative value of its most typical expression, blushing, while arguing against Darwin's theory of blushing, which would deny it any specific function.

Embarrassment, shame, and guilt

Before elaborating on our topic we wish to define our sense of the word “shame” as opposed to “embarrassment”. A common element in shame and embarrassment is that they are unpleasant social emotions. They may be called social in that they have the function of cognitive mediators of the individual's social behaviour (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, & Poggi, 1989): Through the unpleasant feelings they inflict they lead one to avoid or remediate possible misfunctioning in one's relationships with other people.

Apart from this common element and the fact that they may occur at the same time in many situations, one may view shame and embarrassment as largely distinct emotions as to their antecedents, feelings, somatic expressions, and social and biological functions. Yet, as several chapters in this volume have indicated, there is no consensus in the literature that they are different. Some authors (e.g., Goffman, 1967; Zimbardo, 1977) group them in a single category; others distinguish them in terms of severity of inadequacies, with embarrassment experienced for minor flaws and shame for severe flaws (Buss, 1980; Harré, this volume); alternatively, embarrassment is linked to etiquette, and shame to moral worth (Schlenker & Leary, 1982).

In attempting to draw a clearer distinction between the two emotions we find it useful to start with linguistic issues.