Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Cartesian background
- 3 The sensations of the present moment
- 4 “La simple perception de la nature est une sorte de danse”
- 5 Language
- 6 Necessity
- 7 Equilibrium
- 8 “Completely free action”
- 9 The power to refuse
- 10 “The void”
- 11 Geometry
- 12 Incommensurability
- 13 Beauty
- 14 Justice
- 15 “A supernatural virtue”?
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Cartesian background
- 3 The sensations of the present moment
- 4 “La simple perception de la nature est une sorte de danse”
- 5 Language
- 6 Necessity
- 7 Equilibrium
- 8 “Completely free action”
- 9 The power to refuse
- 10 “The void”
- 11 Geometry
- 12 Incommensurability
- 13 Beauty
- 14 Justice
- 15 “A supernatural virtue”?
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The issues discussed in the last chapter concerned in the main what might be called the practical aspect of the conception of oneself as the centre of the universe. But the conception has of course also a theoretical, or epistemological, aspect which comes to a head in difficulties about solipsism. Simone Weil always thought of these aspects as essentially intertwined. The following striking remark is an entry in a notebook made at the very end of her life.
Philosophy (including problems of cognition, etc.) is exclusively an affair of action and practice. That is why it is so difficult to write about it. Difficult in the same way as a treatise on tennis or running, but much more so.
Subjectivist theories of cognition are a perfectly correct description of the condition of those who lack the faculty, which is extremely rare, of coming out of themselves.
I had occasion to discuss solipsism – the most extreme form of a “subjectivist theory of cognition” – in Chapter 3. It will be remembered that as early as her treatment of it in Lectures on Philosophy she had emphasized the importance of action: the quasigeometrical structure and order involved in even the most primitive form of bodily activity is required if anything – including one's very sensations themselves – is to be a possible object of knowledge.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Simone Weil: "The Just Balance" , pp. 133 - 146Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1989