If the community expressed through friendship serves for Plato as a model for both philosophy and politics, as I have argued, why does he often present the philosopher as transcending political life, or even human life altogether? Perhaps the most striking of such presentations involves Socrates' description in the Phaedo of philosophy as “the practice of dying and being dead” (64a). At the beginning of that dialogue, set on the last day of Socrates' life and concluding with his death, Socrates explains to his companions why he does not fear death: since the soul's bondage to the body - and to the senses - prevents clear understanding of the truth, only with the separation of his soul from his body might a philosopher find the knowledge that he seeks. Thus it is by dying, if at all, that a human being could become wise (64a-68b). Socrates even claims that anyone serious about philosophy should desire to follow him by dying as quickly as he can (61b-c). Philosophy, by this account, requires removing oneself from embodied, human life, not only from one's political community, but also from one's friends - a point with which Simmias and Cebes reproach Socrates (63a). The Phaedo thus seems to contradict the view of friendship and philosophy that I have developed in this book.

Try as he might, however, Socrates cannot remove the sting of death, which Plato captures in the tears of Socrates' companions at the end of the dialogue.