‘Impeggabilitas’

In the previous chapter we argued that the possibility of entering into a personal relation with God is a fundamental presupposition of both the Christian life and the Christian faith. This entails that both God and human beings are persons and therefore free agents who are able to take the initiative with regard to their own actions in relation to each other. We argued that one consequence of this presupposition is that human beings have the ability to do evil by resisting the grace of God. We now have to deal with the question whether the same holds for God as the other partner in the relation. If God is a free agent, is he also free and able to do evil? Would that not contradict another fundamental presupposition of Christian faith and life, namely that God is perfectly good?

In the Christian tradition God's perfect goodness has generally been held to entail that he has the attribute not only of impeccantia (freedom from sin), but also of impeccabilitas (inability to sin). Thus, for example Aquinas held that ‘God is unable to will anything evil. Hence it is evident that God cannot sin’ and according to the Westminster Confession, ‘God… being holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin’. Although there is general agreement on the claim that it is impossible for God to sin, there is no such agreement about the sense in which this is impossible. Because of the notorious ambiguity of modal terms like ‘possible’, ‘impossible’ and ‘necessary’, the doctrine of divine impeccability is open to various interpretations.