It would be convenient to regard chapters 14 and 15 of the Theological Political Treatise as merely transitional chapters that summarize and at most refine the arguments of the previous thirteen chapters. There is a modicum of truth in this. For instance, the figure of the sceptic drawn in chapter 7 is here developed in detail. But the important interpretative and discursive reason for viewing these chapters as transitional would be to explain the persistence of one of the major exegetical disagreements about the Treatise, namely, the question whether Spinoza believes that the state ought to be based on piety and obedience, or whether alternatively it should be grounded on the exercise of reason. It is in these two chapters that Spinoza directly confronts the question of the relation of faith as based on the imagination and the emotions, and reason as based on the pursuit of truth. If these are transitional chapters, then it would be understandable that they do not settle the relation of faith and reason, which in turn justifies the persistence of this disagreement in the reception of the Treatise.

As opposed to that view, I hold onto the centrality of these chapters for Spinoza's political enterprise. I will show that, even though Spinoza announces the clear separation of faith and reason in the title of chapter 14, still the fact that their relation remains complicated is critical for his conception of neighbourly love and for how the ‘freedom to philosophize’ is to be understood. The intricate relation between faith and reason as presented here also paves the way for the most critical move we will discover in the last two chapters of the Treatise that articulates Spinoza's conception of democracy, as I will explain. Finally, the way Spinoza presents the relation of faith and reason can be understood – or, more emphatically, is only understandable – within the framework of his epicureanism.

‘Finally’? The Politics of the Distinction between Faith and Reason

The title of chapter 14 could not appear clearer on the question of the relation between faith and reason.