Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- A Note on Translation, Spelling, and Other Conventions
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Official Ulama in Indonesia and Malaysia: Emergence, Perception, and Authority
- 3 The Rise in Piety and the Roots of State Co-optation of the Ulama
- 4 The Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI) in the Post-New Order: A Capture in Progress
- 5 Malaysian Muftis and Official Ulama: The State Captured?
- 6 Conclusion: The Future of Official Ulama and State Capture
- Bibliography
- List of Interviews
- About the Author
- Index
5 - Malaysian Muftis and Official Ulama: The State Captured?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2021
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- A Note on Translation, Spelling, and Other Conventions
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Official Ulama in Indonesia and Malaysia: Emergence, Perception, and Authority
- 3 The Rise in Piety and the Roots of State Co-optation of the Ulama
- 4 The Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI) in the Post-New Order: A Capture in Progress
- 5 Malaysian Muftis and Official Ulama: The State Captured?
- 6 Conclusion: The Future of Official Ulama and State Capture
- Bibliography
- List of Interviews
- About the Author
- Index
Summary
Since becoming prime minister in 1981, Mahathir undertook a major Islamisation programme in Malaysia. He empowered and upgraded ulama institutions, some of which were formed by his predecessors Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970), Abdul Razak Hussin (1970-1976), and Hussein Onn (1976-1981). He strengthened the JKF-MKI (Jawatankuasa Fatwa Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam Malaysia or National Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia), expanded the role of JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or Department of Islamic Development Malaysia), and created IKIM (Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Institute for Islamic Understanding). Mahathir co-opted ulama into these institutions to shore up support for state narratives on Islam, to support his development policies, and most importantly, to counter the opposition party PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia).
Scholars have extensively discussed Malaysia's Islamisation and ulama co-optation under Mahathir's authoritarian rule (Hamayotsu, 2005; Maznah, 2013, pp. 110-118; Rais, 1995; Syed Husin, 2008). According to Syed Hussin, “The religious functionaries from the mufti and the kadi right down to the imam […] have become government servants and paid monthly salaries […] and can be promoted or demoted, depending on [political] circumstances” (2008, pp. 66-67). The perception of ulama co-optation remains strong even after Mahathir's retirement in 2003. Scholars observe yet another trend regarding the behaviour of Malaysian official ulama. They point to ulama becoming increasingly conservative in their thinking (Alatas, 2014; Farish, 2005; Martinez, 2001; Norani et al., 2005). Similarly, Alatas (2014) characterises them as “Salafis” for their persecution of the Malaysian Shia community, a minority Muslim group. He argues that extremist ideas from the Middle East have influenced official ulama's way of thinking and behaviour.
These scholars’ observations on the ulama's loyalty to the government and their conservatism are correct. The ulama's defence of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) leaders, the party's ideology and its policies, on the one hand, and the Malay rulers’ position as the country's custodians of Islam, on the other, reflect strong state co-optation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia , pp. 171 - 214Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2017