This chapter presents a theoretical framework for the study of state capacity in fields of coercive social regulation. Given the pervasive neglect of this policy cluster by the public policy literature and by state-centric scholars, we need to address a basic question before setting out on the path of theory building: what is the distinct nature of coercive social regulation? How do the dynamics of this policy type differ from those driving the politics of economic regulation, and of distribution and redistribution? Once we have identified these forces, we can move on to the larger question of state capacity. Under what conditions, we shall ask, should we expect states to exercise their coercive powers of social regulation successfully?

The theoretical framework developed in this chapter pursues an institutional logic of argument that distinguishes between the factors underlying state capacity at two distinct stages of the policy process. As a first step, we will specify the conditions under which legislators will translate popular demands for social regulation into corresponding statutes. Second, we will examine the conditions under which executive actors will wield the power to implement these legislative mandates. The remainder of this book will empirically test these propositions. The determinants of legislative capacity will be examined in Chapter 2, whereas the proposed conditions underlying executive state capacity will be tested in Chapters 3 and 4. Before further specifying these conditions, this chapter will begin by outlining the basic characteristics of the politics of coercive social regulation.

THE POLITICS OF COERCIVE SOCIAL REGULATION

The modern state, Max Weber has famously argued, can be defined as an institution claiming the monopoly of legitimate coercion within a given territory (1979).