It is a commonplace of our books that sixteenth-century England witnessed the creation of a paternal state; the early Tudors, in particular, are held to have pursued a discernible policy towards the social and economic life of their country. The point is more often assumed than argued; if one attempts to trace its origins and grounds, one ends up either with general references to the statute book or with Georg Schanz's impressive work – Die englische Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters– published as long ago as 1881. Though Schanz dealt only with trade and industry, the usual notions seem to assume an even more universal programme for society. Doubts have not been entirely silent. Schanz may have too readily identified Tudor policy and the national interest; there is the possibility that what to us looks like perspicacious paternalism was really fiscal opportunism; the example of Edward III is ever there to warn one. Mr Stone has argued that ‘security, not prosperity, was the main object of Tudor economic policy’. Professor Fisher has denied that sixteenth-century economic history was in any way the product of planning; to him market conditions were paramount. But these disputes all rest on a common assumption: it is supposed that we know what policy was and can confidently ascribe it to Crown and government. It is thought that we know enough to say that Henry VII did this or Henry VIII wanted that.