Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Theories of political economy
- Introduction
- 1 Politics and economics
- 2 The classical approach
- 3 Marxian political economy
- 4 Neoclassical political economy
- 5 Keynesian political economy
- 6 Economic approaches to politics
- 7 Power-centered approaches to political economy
- 8 State-centered approaches to political economy
- 9 Justice-centered theories
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Power-centered approaches to political economy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Theories of political economy
- Introduction
- 1 Politics and economics
- 2 The classical approach
- 3 Marxian political economy
- 4 Neoclassical political economy
- 5 Keynesian political economy
- 6 Economic approaches to politics
- 7 Power-centered approaches to political economy
- 8 State-centered approaches to political economy
- 9 Justice-centered theories
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The interactions between power and economic phenomena may provide an appealing focus for political economy. However, the obstacles to constructing political economy on a foundation of power should not be underestimated. These obstacles are especially difficult if economics is interpreted as market behavior (one of the definitions of economics in Chapter 1).
Markets are closely related to the idea of choice among freely contracting individuals. Markets are impersonal, dispersed structures of buyers and sellers operating independently of one another in pursuit of private goals. The number of actors is large, opportunity costs are never so high as to create strong influence networks, and no collusion exists. This view of economics – as tied to markets – deprives it of power in two ways. First, since agents face an environment characterized by voluntary choice, and since from the agents' standpoint many things are given – factor prices, technology, the distribution of endowments, and wants – there is very little to decide and a very limited range of strategic behavior. Second, no single agent has enough economic capability, in terms of capital, labor, goods, to influence any other agent. Of course, any agent may refuse to contract with another or may withdraw resources previously contracted. But here the damage done is strictly limited to the loss of the benefit derived from the exchange. A cannot hurt B more than it can help B, and withholding a benefit is not seen as power so long as alternatives for B exist.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Theories of Political Economy , pp. 159 - 180Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992