Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the second edition
- Preface to the first edition
- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 McTaggart on time's unreality
- 3 The Block universe
- 4 Asymmetries within time
- 5 Tensed time
- 6 Dynamic time
- 7 Time and consciousness
- 8 Time travel
- 9 Conceptions of void
- 10 Space: the classical debate
- 11 Absolute motion
- 12 Motion in spacetime
- 13 Curved space
- 14 Tangible space
- 15 Spatial anti-realism
- 16 Zeno and the continuum I
- 17 Zeno and the continuum II
- 18 Special relativity
- 19 Relativity and reality
- 20 General relativity
- 21 Spacetime metaphysics
- 22 Strings
- Notes
- Glossary
- Web resources
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Tensed time
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the second edition
- Preface to the first edition
- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 McTaggart on time's unreality
- 3 The Block universe
- 4 Asymmetries within time
- 5 Tensed time
- 6 Dynamic time
- 7 Time and consciousness
- 8 Time travel
- 9 Conceptions of void
- 10 Space: the classical debate
- 11 Absolute motion
- 12 Motion in spacetime
- 13 Curved space
- 14 Tangible space
- 15 Spatial anti-realism
- 16 Zeno and the continuum I
- 17 Zeno and the continuum II
- 18 Special relativity
- 19 Relativity and reality
- 20 General relativity
- 21 Spacetime metaphysics
- 22 Strings
- Notes
- Glossary
- Web resources
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Tense versus dynamism
In §1.6 I noted that we should not assume that the eternal–dynamic dispute maps neatly onto the tenseless–tensed dispute. The latter revolves around the sorts of concepts that are needed to describe the world in a metaphysically adequate way, whereas the former concerns the reality or otherwise of temporal passage. The B-theory we have just been considering combines two claims:
• The world is a four-dimensional ensemble, and all times and events are equally real and coexist.
• The world can be fully described in tenseless terms.
In Chapter 6 I will be looking at ways of taking issue with the first claim; in this chapter I will consider the implications of rejecting the second.
In a sequence of papers spread over some years, E. J. Lowe has sought to defend the A-framework against its critics (such as McTaggart and Mellor), and thus establish the viability of the tensed conception of time. Since many B-theorists have argued that the tensed conception is incoherent, his arguments on this point are of interest in their own right. In Chapter 2 I introduced McTaggart's A-paradox, but since it proved peripheral to the main point that McTaggart was trying to make, I did not consider it in any detail; a remedy was suggested but not examined closely. Similarly, in Chapter 3 we encoun tered Mellor's argument that tensed statements have tenseless truth-conditions, but we have not yet considered counter arguments.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Time and Space , pp. 63 - 67Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2010